AeonBox: Logical Guardrails for Agents

In this post I will explain why current permissions in agents are not sufficient, and they cannot prevent the lethal trifecta issue, and how liquid types as a sandbox mechanism can address this limitation. Permissions and Agents The most powerful feature of agents is also its downfall for many critical applications: access to the terminal, files, your computer or the internet. Whenever you use an agent for coding, you are always prompted for permission for every single terminal command it wants to execute — of course! it could run rm -rf / or delete your production database. But this does not last for long, as we know from several decades of research. If security compromises the productivity of users, they use all the tricks to reduce that barrier. So in practice, your agent shows you 5 harmless commands that you accept, and as the gains of agents become limited by the need for you to babysitting it, you switch to --dangerously-skip-permissions or --yolo mode, removing any constraint…