Apple Defeats Liability for Not Scanning iCloud for CSAM, But the Judge Was Not Pleased–Amy v. Apple

This case involves Apple’s handling of user-uploaded files hosted in private iCloud storage. Instead of adopting PhotoDNA to scan hosted files for CSAM, Apple created its own proprietary alternative, NeuralHash, which apparently wasn’t as good. So Apple U-turned on its efforts to scan for CSAM in its cloud storage. Instead, Apple implemented end-to-end encryption for iCloud files. Apple’s manuevers confused the public and seemed like an embarrassing unforced error for Apple. It also ensured pressure from governments and plaintiffs, including CSAM victims, who preferred Apple’s more interventionist approaches, which Apple had voluntarily demonstrated it was willing to do. This lawsuit represents a full-scale attack on Apple and Section 230. “Plaintiffs allege that Apple’s failure to implement any known CSAM detection is a design defect because Apple can safely implement readily available features to prevent the spread of known CSAM but has continuously failed to do so.” Prior blog…